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This paper contributes new evidence from two large 
household surveys on the compliance of firms with 
severance pay regulations in Indonesia, and the extent to 
which changes in severance pay regulations could affect 
employment rigidity. Compliance appears to be low, 
as only one-third of workers entitled to severance pay 
report receiving it, and on average workers only collect 
40 percent of the payment due to them. Eligible female 
and low-wage workers are least likely to report receiving 
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payments. Widespread non-compliance is consistent with 
trends in employment rigidity, which remained essentially 
unchanged following the large increases in severance 
mandated by the 2003 law. These results suggest that 
workers may benefit from a compromise that relaxes 
severance pay regulations while improving enforcement 
of severance pay statutes, and possibly establishing a 
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1.  Introduction 
The  financial  crisis  that  emerged  in  the  United  States  in  mid-2007  quickly 
transformed into a global credit crunch that sharply reduced global trade flows.  Many 
countries were affected by the  severe  global recession that followed, and millions of 
individuals throughout the world lost jobs, leading to increased informality and working 
poverty. In the aftermath of the crisis, policymakers throughout the world are questioning 
whether existing labor market regulations successfully balanced the competing goals of 
maintaining flexibility and protecting workers.  
   While discussions over the scope of labor market regulations are often heated, 
views are typically based either on the predictions of theoretical models or anecdotes. 
The lack of evidence is particularly acute for developing countries, where hard data are 
rare and mechanisms for enforcing regulations tend to be limited. Lack of enforcement is 
a particularly serious concern, given that significant portions of workers report earning 
wages that fall below the statutory minimum.
2 No systematic evidence, however, exists 
regarding  compliance  with  other  labor  regulations ,  making  it  difficult  to   make  an 
informed assessment of the costs and benefits of regulatory reform.   
This paper contributes new evidence on the compliance of firms with severance 
pay  regulations  in  Indonesia,  and  the  extent  to  which  changes  in  severance  pay 
regulations could affect employment rigidity.  This evidence sheds light on a vigorous 
policy debate that arose  in Indonesia  prior to the onset of the global financial crisis, 
following the passage of a 2003 labor law that  increased employment protection and 
severance pay. The debate pitted the business community, which warned that increases in 
severance pay regulations would reduce employment ,  against organized labor, which 
argued that severance pay makes an important contribution to income security. 
The  reaction  to  proposed  changes  to  severance  pay  regulations  in  2006 
exacerbated this  debate.  Following persistent lobbying by the business community, as 
well as firm surveys that showed that  high severance pay obligations  were a serious 
concern, the easing of severance pay requirements became a major part of investment -
                                                 
2 See, for example, World Bank (2011) finds that 40 percent of wage workers report earnings below the 
minimum wage in Indonesia in 2007. This is broadly consistent with reported estimates that non-
compliance rates are as high as 33 percent in Costa Rica (Gindling and Terrell, 2007) and 45 percent in 
South Africa (Bhorat et al, 2010).     3 
climate  reforms  proposed  by  the  coordinating  ministry  of  economic  affairs.    These 
proposed changes, however, were put on hold in April 2006, after large demonstrations 
were organized by labor unions (Manning and Roesad, 2007).  
Given the controversy surrounding  severance pay  in  Indonesia, an  analysis  of 
survey  data  can  impart  important  information  on  the  performance  of  the  current 
severance pay regulations.  We exploit two household surveys that contain information 
on the receipt of severance pay following job separation: The Indonesian Family Life 
Survey (IFLS), which collected data on severance pay for the first time in 2007, and the 
National Labor Force Survey (Sakernas) which collected data on severance pay for the 
first  time  in  2008.    These  surveys  provide  a  unique  opportunity  to  conduct  the  first 
household-level  analysis  of  severance  pay  in  Indonesia,  and  to  our  knowledge,  the 
developing world (Holzmann, et al, 2011).
3  
The results  show that compliance is low  – only a third of workers entitled to 
severance pay report receiving it, and on average workers only collect 40 percent of the 
payment due to them. Eligible female and low-wage workers are least likely to report 
receiving payments. Widespread non-compliance is consistent with trends in employment 
rigidity, which essentially remained constant following the large increases in severance 
mandated by the 2003 law. Weak enforcement in practice suggests that workers may 
benefit from a compromise that relaxes severance pay regulations while establishing a 
system of unemployment benefits. Enforcement can also be improved by establishing an 
administrative entity dedicated to monitoring compliance with severance pay regulations 
can improve the existing system.  Other countries with severance pay programs, such as 
Barbados and Slovenia, have established arrangements to oversee severance pay statutes. 
The structure of the paper is as follows.  In section two, we review the concerns of 
both  the  business  community  and  employee  representatives  and  present  evidence  on 
aggregate trends in labor market rigidity.  Section three turns to the survey data, and 
demonstrates that not only are few workers eligibile for severance pay, but most eligible 
workers do not report receiving benefits.  The descriptive analysis is followed in section 
four by suggestions for policy reform. 
                                                 
3 Vodopivec, et al (2009) finds that one third of all covered workers do not receive severance pay, in the 
high-income context of Slovenia, MacIsaac and Rama (2001) find that Peruvian workers that are more 
likely to be covered earn lower wage, but they are unable to observe receipt of severance pay directly.     4 
2.  Severance Pay and Employment Rigidity  
 
The first concern about severance pay in Indonesia is that the costs associated 
with  the  program  are  high  and,  as  a  consequence,  distort  firms’  hiring  and  firing 
decisions.  Business  representatives  argue  that  these  high  costs  discourage  them  from 
hiring new employees on a permanent basis, influence their lay-off decisions in response 
to contemporaneous economic conditions and lead to a deterioration in the investment 
climate. 
Severance  pay  compensation  rates  in  Indonesia  began  to  increase  in  the  mid-
1990s.  There  were  three  changes  to  these  regulations  in  the  last  decade  of  the  last 
century and he first decade of this century: 1996, 2000, and 2003.  Figure 1 shows the 
severance pay rates associated with these three legislative changes to the regulations. In 
1996, the severance payment was estimated to be equivalent to a “hiring tax” of about 2.0 
monthly wages per employee.
4  The legislative changes in 2000 led to an increase  in the 
“hiring tax” to an average of 3.4 months.  With the changes introduced in 2003, the 
average severance payment is about 4.1 monthly wages per employee or 34 percent of an 
employee’s annual wage.  The maximum severance pay is close to 30 months of wages in 
the case of a dismissal for an economic cause beyond the control of the employee. 
The current employment protection legislation, Manpower Law (No. 13/2003), 
regulates severance pay rates in Indonesia.  In terms of severance regulations, Indonesia 
falls into the group of economies in East and South Asia with more generous statutes, in 
the same range as Bangladesh, Korea, Nepal, the Philippines, and the People’s Republic 
of China.  As stated above, business representatives in Indonesian claim that severance 
pay costs are high and constrain the workforce decisions that firms make. 
One way to evaluate these claims is to examine the trends in various indicators of 
labor market rigidity.   Using unemployment data and work experience data from the 
annual Sakernas labor force surveys from 1999 to 2008 for turnover in the labor market, 
                                                 
4  The hiring tax measures the discounted expected cost, at a time a worker is hired, of dismissing 
him/her in the future or if the worker quits.  It shows the severance payment an employer expects 
to pay in the future for hiring a new worker.  The calculation is based on the probability a new 
worker leaves in a particular year based on the reason for the separation.  Different rates apply 
depending  on  the  specific  reason  for  the  separation  (quit,  dismissal  for  minor  violations  or 
economic cause).  See Alihsjahbana (2007) and Padjadjaran University (2004).   5 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of key indicators in Indonesia.  The unemployment rate 
shows a slight upward trend over the last decade.  Except for 2006, the three turnover 
rates are contained within a trendless band over the same period. 
The percentage of all labor market participants who experienced a job separation 
in the previous year is shown in Figure 2 as the turnover rate, which is an indicator of the 
degree of employment rigidity.  Except for 2006, the turnover rate consistently lies in the 
range  between  6.0  to  8.0  percent.    The  largest  proportion  of  all  job  separations  was 
voluntary.   
Of the involuntary job separations, lay-off or business failure was cited by the 
majority of individuals as the main reason for the job separation.
5  With one exception, 
involuntary  separations  consistently  range  between  2.0  and  3.0  percent  of  annual 
employment.  Of all persons who experienced a job separation, the majority were  wage 
and salary employees working in the formal sector. For nine of the ten years, from 1999 
to 2008, they consistently represent between 50 and 75 percent of all job separations.  
Except for 2006, the range of employee separations falls between 3.7 and 5 .6 percent of 
annual employment. 
Overall, Figure 2 indicates that, despite the legislative changes to severance pay 
regulations, turnover rates have been constant.  Hence, the data do not support the claim 
that labor market flexibility has been compromised  by the increases in severance pay 
introduced with the legislative changes. 
It is important to note that only a s mall share of the working population in 
Indonesia is covered by severance pay regulations because most labor market participants 
are employed in the informal sector.  Of formal sector employees, most job separations 
tend to be  voluntary.  The majority of  formal sector employees who do separate from 
their jobs are eligible for severance.  Few of these employees, however, collect their full 
entitlement to severance pay. 
Actual practice departs substantially from the statutory regulations; the costs of 
severance pay are much lower than those implied by the severance st atutes.  As a result, 
                                                 
5  Similarly, voluntary separations form the majority of responses in the IFLS (2007) survey.  
Involuntary job separations accounted for 21.8 percent of all separations and these respondents 
cited two main reasons: company closed/relocated/restructured; fired for other reason.   6 
the actual costs of severance pay based on data from the two surveys examined in this 
paper are 10 to 14 percent of the costs suggested by the statutory regulations.  Three 
possibilities could account for the discrepancy: employees are not aware of the statutory 
regulations;  compliance  by  firms  is  low;  enforcement  of  the  regulations  relating  to 
severance pay appears to be low in Indonesia. 
It  seems  likely  that  employers  avoid  paying  severance  by  signing  short-term 
contracts with employees, some of whom are unaware of their right to severance pay.  
Other employees may know of their rights but avoid involvement in the legal process to 
enforce their right due to delays and litigation costs.  This paper does not examine these 
issues  because  we  do  not  have  the  requisite  data  on  knowledge,  costs  and  delays.  
Gathering such information is an important direction for future research and could be 
achieved by adding supplementary questions into the surveys. 
While the data do not permit us to directly examine the enforcement of severance 
pay regulations in Indonesia, we can explore the first two possibilities.  Both surveys can 
directly address the concern raised by employee representatives: compliance of severance 
pay regulations by firms is low.  Prior to the introduction of a set of survey questions 
about severance pay, the claims of employee representatives were speculative in nature.  
The two surveys that collected data on severance pay for the first time in 2007 and 2008 
give us the opportunity to test the validity of this claim.  The following section presents 
information on the scope of severance pay and compliance of pay regulations. 
 
3.  Coverage and Scope of Severance Pay  
The Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) collected data on severance pay for 
the first time in 2007, while the National Labor Force Survey (Sakernas) collected data 
for the first time in 2008.  Three aspects of severance pay are described in the analysis 
below: coverage of and eligibility for severance pay; the scope of severance pay; and the 
compliance of current severance pay regulations. 
 
3.1  Coverage of and eligibility for severance pay 
  Data from the work experience modules of the two surveys are used to address the 
question of who is more likely to experience a job separation.  As wage-and-salary labor   7 
market participants are potentially covered by severance pay regulations, the analysis 
concentrates on those government and private sector employees who experienced a job 
separation.  For the IFLS (2007) survey, the job separation refers to the previous five 
years of employment; to the previous two years in the Sakernas (2008) survey. 
  The specific reason for the job separation is important because it affects both the 
entitlement to compensation and the size of the prospective payment.  For instance, if a 
job  separation is  due to  an economic cause beyond the control  of the employee, the 
compensation package (both severance pay and long-service leave) is significantly larger 
and the cost to the firm is greater. 
  In the IFLS (2007) survey, involuntary separations (lay-off and business closure) 
accounted for 21.8 percent of all job separations; voluntary separations were 56.3 percent 
and  “other”  accounted  for  21.9  percent.    The  responses  identifying  the  reason  for  a 
separation are similar in the Sakernas (2008) survey.  Involuntary separations (lay-off and 
business failure) accounted for 27.9 percent of all job separations.  But 39.4 percent of all 
responses were due to “other” reasons where the initiative for the separation cannot be 
identified.  Not knowing the reason for the separation makes it difficult to determine the 
potential severance payment. 
As stated above, most of the job separations in both of the surveys are voluntary.  
Table 1 compares job separators with all government and private sector employees using 
the Sakernas (2008) survey.  Employees who experienced a job separation in the previous 
two years are disproportionately younger, female, and well-educated.  Job separations are 
concentrated in industries where entry and exit is relatively easy and mainly in the private 
domestic sector.  Job separators have a relatively short employment relationship with the 
firm and tend to earn lower monthly wages. 
The turnover rate is higher for younger age groups and steadily decreases with 
age (except for the oldest group aged 55 years and older).  While there are about twice as 
many men employed in the formal wage-and-salary sector, the turnover rate for women is 
about two-thirds higher.  Job separators are relatively well-educated and the turnover rate 
is highest for those who graduated from high school. 
  There is a disproportionate concentration of job separations in industries where 
entry  and  exit  is  relatively  easy,  such  as  manufacturing,  trade,  and  especially  public   8 
services. Moreover, job separators have a relatively short employment relationship with 
the firm (that is, their tenure is less than four years).  Knowing the length of tenure is 
important  in  assessing  the  potential  costs  associated  with  the  severance  regulations, 
particularly since Manpower Law 13/2003, Article 156, raised the rates of severance pay 
for employees with three or more years of tenure.
6  The majority of job separators worked 
in the domestic private sector either for a domestic firm (36.4  percent) or as a domestic 
worker (45.8 percent).
7  There was little difference, however, in the size of the firm in 
which they previously worked.  Those persons who separated from their job tend to be 
employed in agriculture, trade and social services whe re the turnover rates are 21.5 
percent, 11.9 percent, 21.2 percent, respectively. 
  The firms in which all job separato rs were employed tend to be concentrated in 
Bali and Java.
8  Most of the turnover occurs amongst employees with low job tenure .  
While the proportion of all wage and salary employees with tenure between 0 – 3 years is 
0.4660, it is 0.7489 for employees with a job separation.  The turnover rate for those with 
tenure between 0 – 3 years is 19.5 percent.  Compared to all wage-and-salary employees, 
job  separators  tend  to  earn  lower  monthly  wages.    In  addition,  they  tend  to  be 
concentrated at the lower end of the wage distribution and face a higher turnover rate. 
 
3.2  Scope of severance pay 
Employees who were eligible for severance pay and received a payment after a 
job  separation  tend  to  be  young,  fairly  well-educated  and  working  in  large  firms  in 
industrial  regions  of  the  country.  The  data  indicates  that  few  are  aware  of  their 
entitlement to severance pay.  This lack of awareness may be due to the complexity of the 
legislation regarding severance pay but, more than likely, it is exacerbated by the lack of 
formal contracts that explicitly define the employment relationship. 
                                                 
6 See figure 4.4 in World Bank (2011) for a detailed description of severance pay regulations  
7  Question R11a of the Sakernas (2008) survey asks individuals to identify the type of business 
concern where they worked before the job separation occurred: government agency; state-owned 
firm; domestic private firm; foreign firm; and domestic worker. 
8  The questions in the firing module of Sakernas (2008) pertain only to the industrial districts of 
Indonesia.   9 
  In the IFLS (2007) survey data, approximately 35 percent of all labor market 
participants work in the formal sector.  These wage-and-salary employees are potentially 
covered by the severance regulations.  Of those individuals in covered employment who 
are employed by a firm falling under the auspices of the regulations, not all meet the 
requirements.  Furthermore, of those who do meet the necessary coverage requirements, 
not  all  are  eligible  to  receive  severance  pay.
9  Of  government  and  private  sector 
employees working in covered employment, only 14.8 percent state that they are entitled 
to severance pay as one of the set of benefits offered by their employer.  Based on this 
low percentage, it seems that many formal sector employees lack a clear understanding of 
severance pay eligibility. 
  In both surveys, women in covered employment are less likely than men to be 
eligible for severance pay in the event of a job separation.
10  As Table 2 shows, eligibility 
for severance pay increases strongly with age, but there are no noticeable differences in 
eligibility by level of education.  While there is variation in eligibility for severance pay 
across industries, there is no apparent pattern.  There is, however, a strong systematic 
relationship  between  eligibility  for  severance  pay  and  tenure:  eligibility  increases 
strongly with tenure.  For firms of different sizes, the eligibility proportion steadily 
increases with firm size. 
There are two noticeable differences, however, between the surveys.  The first 
difference is the likelihood of eligibility for severance across firm owne rship status.  In 
the IFLS (2007), wage and salary workers employed by state-owned enterprises are more 
likely to be eligible for severance than employees working in a government agency .  On 
the other hand, the likelihood of eligibility for severance is similar across firm-ownership 
status  in  Sakernas  (2008) .    Second,  neither  survey  shows  a  consistently  positive 
association between eligibility and the level of wages across the full range of wage rates. 
 
3.3  Compliance with current severance pay regulations 
                                                 
9  Question TK25A3 of the IFLS (2007) survey asks individuals to identify a set of benefits 
offered by the employer.  One of these benefits is severance payment eligibility. 
10  Table 2 display details of severance eligibility and receipt of severance pay based on the 
Sakernas (2008) survey.  The IFLS (2007) findings are consistent.    10 
  While  payment  of  severance  and  long-service  leave  after  a  job  separation  is 
mandated by legislation in Indonesia, information from survey data suggests that there is 
a high rate of non-compliance with the regulations.  Approximately one-third of legally 
eligible wage-and-salary employees receive a severance payment after a job separation 
occurs; depending on the survey, the average ratio of the severance payment received to 
the legally entitled amount is either slightly over one-third (IFLS, 2007) or just under 
one-third (Sakernas, 2008). 
  There are two aspects of non-compliance.  The first aspect is the proportion of 
eligible  formal  sector  employees  who  receive  a  payment.    The  second  aspect  is  the 
proportion of the entitlement amount that is actually received.  The receipt of severance 
pay  depends  on  two  factors:  the  proportion  of  job  separators  who  are  eligible  (as 
described  in  the  previous  section)  and  the  proportion  of  those  eligible  who  actually 
receive a payment after a job separation occurs.  Both factors determine the ratio of actual 
severance payment to the legally entitled amount.  The present discussion emphasizes 
this ratio. 
In both surveys, the proportion of eligible employees who received severance pay 
increases with age but is essentially the same for individuals with differing levels of 
formal education.  In the IFLS (2007) survey, there is no difference between women and 
men in terms of severance pay receipt.  In the Sakernas (2008) survey, however, eligible 
men are about 39 percent more likely to receive severance than eligible women. 
  There is variation in the share of eligible persons who received severance pay by 
industry in both surveys, but there is no apparent pattern.  There is a strong systematic 
relationship between the share of eligible employees who received severance pay and 
tenure: the share increases with the years in continuous employment with the same firm.  
Similarly,  there  is  a  strong  systematic  association  between  the  share  of  eligible 
employees who received severance pay and the size of the firm: the proportion steadily 
increases with firm size.  About one-quarter of eligible wage-and-salary workers receive 
severance pay if they are employed by a government agency.  Eligible wage-and-salary 
workers employed by foreign or transnational corporations are the most likely to receive 
severance pay, while eligible workers employed by state-owned enterprises or domestic 
private firms are equally likely to receive severance pay.  There is more variation in   11 
receipt of severance pay among eligible employees across firm ownership, however, in 
the Sakernas (2008) survey.  Generally, eligible employees who received severance pay 
steadily increases with the wage level in both surveys. 
  While only a limited number of job separators actually received severance pay, 
those who did were generally satisfied with their payment.  Only the IFLS (2007) survey 
specifically addresses employee satisfaction with respect to severance pay.  Of the four 
levels of satisfaction identified in the survey, 68.6 percent stated that they were either 
very satisfied or satisfied with their compensation while only 28.9 percent indicated they 
were dissatisfied and just 2.5 percent stated that they were very dissatisfied with the 
severance pay they received. 
  On  the  first  aspect  of non-compliance, the proportion of eligible  formal  sector 
employees who receive a payment, two-thirds of all eligible employees who separated 
from a job did not receive their severance payment.  The second aspect is the proportion 
of the entitlement amount that is actually received.  It is to this aspect that we now turn.  
The conclusion we draw from the survey data is that employers who make a severance 
payment actually pay less than the amount to which their employees are entitled. 
Table 3 shows the amount of legally entitled severance pay and actual payments 
by a set of employee and job characteristics.  These calculations are based on weighted 
data  from  the  IFLS  (2007)  survey.  The  mean  monthly  wage  among  recipients  was 
968,892 IDR; the severance entitlement amounted to 9,361,576 IDRs of which about 40 
percent  had  actually  been  received  to  date  (3,607,587  IRDs).    Part  of  both  totals, 
however, could be associated with long-service compensation as well as severance pay. 
  The average amount actually received by women and men as a proportion of the 
legal  entitlement  is  nearly  identical:  0.3937  and  0.3816,  respectively.    Both  legally 
entitled severance pay amounts and actual severance pay received increases with age.  
The proportion of actual receipt to the legally entitled severance pay ranges from 0.1138 
at ages 15-18 years to 0.8883 at ages 50-64 years.  These proportions compare to the all-
age average of 0.3854.  The legally entitled amount and the proportion of that amount 
received both increase with the level of education except for the highest group, those with 
tertiary education.   12 
  Generally,  there  is  variation  in  both  legally  entitled  and  actual  severance  pay 
received across industries, but there is limited deviation from the overall average when 
the ratio of the two is considered.  There are, however, important exceptions.  Three 
industries demonstrate below average ratios of actual severance pay received to legally 
entitled payments: financial services, construction, and manufacturing. 
  In  terms  of  tenure,  the  relationship  between  both  legally  entitled  and  actual 
severance pay is highly positive and systematic.  Legally entitled severance pay amounts 
increase from 0.923 million IDRs for formal sector workers with less than one year of 
tenure to 22.154 million IDRs for employees with 10+ years.  The ratio of actual to 
legally entitled severance pay increases with tenure, rising dramatically for long-tenured 
employees.  For all groups with tenure of less than 10 years, the ratio is less than half the 
overall  average  (0.3854)  whereas  for  tenure  of  10+  years  it  is  0.6169, 1.6  times  the 
overall average.  It is still low, however, for the 10+ year group. 
  For firms of different sizes, there is no systematic relationship between both legal 
entitlement  to  and  actual  severance  pay  received.    In  firms  with  fewer  than  100 
employees, the ratio of actual severance pay received to the legally entitled amount is 
below the overall average of 0.3854; on the other hand, in the largest firms the ratio is 
0.5814, 1.5 times the overall average. 
  Wage-and-salary workers employed by government agencies are the least likely 
to receive the severance payment to which they are legally entitled, less than half the 
overall average.  Employees in state-owned enterprises are the most likely to receive the 
full amount to which they are legally entitled.  Employees in domestic private firms have 
approximately the average likelihood of recipiency while those in foreign or transnational 
corporations have a likelihood of nearly 50 percent above the overall average. 
  Across the wage distribution, there is a systematic relationship between both legal 
entitlement to and actual severance pay received.  While the legally entitled amount is 
approximately ten times the monthly wage for all-wage groups, those with below-average 
wages receive a below-average share of their legal entitlement.  Except for the highest 
group receiving a monthly wage of more than 1.5 million, for all other employees the 
ratio is below the overall average.  For the high wage group, however, the likelihood of 
receipt is 1.4 times the overall average.   13 
  Table 4 shows the amount of legally entitled severance pay and actual payments 
by a set of employee and job characteristics using data from the Sakernas (2008) survey.  
Here, the amount actually received by women as a proportion of their legal entitlement is 
higher  than  that  for  men:  0.3559  and  0.2697,  respectively.    Generally,    both  legally 
entitled severance pay amounts and actual severance pay received increase across the age 
distribution up to 35-49 years: from 0.0681 at ages 15-18 years to 0.3985 at ages 35-49 
years. Contrary to a priori expectations, the proportions for the oldest two age groups 
drastically decline.  These proportions compare to the all-age average of 0.2961.  Except 
for  those  employees  with  less  than  primary  education,  the  legally  entitled  amount 
increases  with  education.    The  ratio  of  the  amount  actually  received,  however,  only 
increases at the highest education levels (that is, senior secondary and tertiary). 
  Generally, there is wide variation in both legally entitled and actual severance pay 
received across industries.  The industry patterns differ greatly across the two surveys.  
The relationship between both legally entitled and actual severance pay is positive and 
systematic  for  tenure.    Legally  entitled  severance  pay  amounts  increase  from  1.135 
million IDRs for those with less than one year of tenure to 22.942 million IDRs for 
employees with 10+ years.  Generally, the ratio of actual to legally entitled severance pay 
also  increases  with  tenure,  rising  from  0.1897  for  less  than  one  year  to  0.3055  for 
employees with 10+ years of tenure. 
  For firms of different sizes, there is a positive and systematic relationship between 
both legal entitlement to and actual severance pay received.  In firms with fewer than 20 
employees, the ratio of actual severance pay received to the legally entitled amount is 
below the overall  average of 0.2916;  on the other hand, in  the largest two firm-size 
categories, both ratios exceed this average. 
  Wage-and-salary workers employed by government agencies are the least likely 
to receive the severance payment to which they are legally entitled, only about 20 percent 
of the overall average.  Employees in domestic private firms are the most likely to receive 
the full amount to which they are legally entitled: 0.3816.  Employees in state-owned 
enterprises have approximately the average likelihood of recipiency while the likelihood 
in  the  remaining  three  firm-status  categories  is  below-average.  Across  the  wage   14 
distribution, there is no apparent relationship between both legal entitlement to and actual 
severance pay received. 
If  a  job  separation  is  due  to  an  economic  cause  beyond  the  control  of  the 
employee,  the  compensation  package  (both  severance  pay  and  long-service  leave)  is 
significantly larger and the cost to the firm is greater.  Hence, it is important to identify 
those employees who were fired for an economic cause.  In the IFLS (2007) survey 16.3 
percent of wage and salary employees with a job separation were fired in the past five 
years  because  the  firm  merged  or  restructured.    While  the  proportion  of  these  job 
separators who were legally eligible to receive severance pay on termination was 0.8807, 
only 0.4041 actually received a payment.
11  The average severance entitlement amounted 
to 11,827,577 IDRs and the average amount of severance paid was 4,864,027 IDRs; 
about 40 percent of the amount to which an employee dismissed for an economic reason 
was entitled.  This proportion of severance pay actually received (0.4112) was similar to 
the overall average of 0.3853 for all employees legally entitled to severance payments.  
Given that a job separation due to an economic cause beyond the control of the employee 
would automatically confer eligibility, the similarity in both proportions suggests a high 
degree of non-compliance. 
  In the Sakernas (2008) survey, 16.0 percent of emp loyees were separated from 
their job in the last two years because they were laid -off by their  firm; approximately 
one-third were laid-off because the company failed.
12  This proportion represents 4.2 
percent of all job separations in the previous two years.  While the proportion of these job 
separators who were legally eligible to receive severance pay on termination was 0.7859, 
only  0.1607  actually  received  it.    The  average  severance  entitlement  amounted  to 
45,256,847 IDRs and the average amount of severance paid was 15,646,787 IDRs; about 
34.6 percent of the amount to which an employee dismissed for an economic reason was 
entitled.  This proportion of severance pay actually received (0.3457) was similar to the 
                                                 
11  Employees are legally eligible if (1) they have a work contract or letter of appointment which 
is permanent/open-ended; (2) dismissed for reasons stipulated by legislation. 
12  Question R18 of the Sakernas (2008) survey asks wage and salary employees who were laid-
off to identify the main reason for the lay-off.  The proportion who responded that their job 
separation was due to the rationalization of the firm is 35.8 percent; followed by 26.0 percent for 
company bankruptcy/loss/disaster.   15 
overall  average  of  0.2916  for  all  employees  legally  entitled  to  severance  payments.  
Similar to the IFLS (2007), both proportions suggests a high degree of non-compliance. 
The results of the analysis highlight two important findings about the compliance 
of  employers  with  the  severance  pay  regulations.  First,  employees  who  are  more 
vulnerable are more affected by non-compliance.  Second, while de jure severance costs 
may be high for covered wage-and-salary workers, firms frequently do not actually pay 
the legally entitled amount to eligible employees.  The required payments may not be 
delivered when the payment is due, however, if a firm enters bankruptcy because other 
creditors may have higher priority claims to the assets of the firm.  If the rate of non-
compliance due to bankruptcy is high, then an employer-based severance program would 
be ineffective in  providing income security to  wage-and-salary employees.    A sound 
company,  on  the  other  hand,  may  face  above-average  costs  when  the  volume  of 
severance payments is high. 
 
4.  Conclusions 
The current impasse in reforming severance regulations reflects objections from 
both employers and employees.  While recent negotiations have either collapsed or ended 
in a stalemate, renewed efforts are needed to find a workable compromise between the 
interests of employers and those of employee representatives.  In addition, the reform 
options need to consider the voice of vulnerable workers who have been excluded from 
the debate.  While it is not possible to assess the degree of hardship wage-and-salary 
workers face following a job separation, it is possible to infer that workers experience 
two significant disadvantages.  First, severance payments are received by only a minority 
of eligible employees.  Second, the severance payments to recipients are only a fraction 
of the legally-entitled amounts.  Approximately one-third of legally-eligible employees 
actually  receive  severance  pay  after  a  job  separation.    On  average,  the  ratio  of  the 
severance pay received to the legally-entitled amount is below 40 percent.  The product 
of these two ratios yields a wage-loss protection share of between 10 to 14 percent of 
eligible severed workers’ monthly wages. 
Indonesia lacks an administrative structure to pool the risk of a job separation 
between employers and employees.  While the statutory severance pay regulations appear   16 
to be high, current employer practices contain the costs for firms, especially for low-wage 
earners.  Our recommendation is to find a workable compromise that not only balances 
employer concerns about high severance pay rates and employee concerns about income 
security, but also considers vulnerable workers who have been excluded from the debate. 
It  would  be  appropriate  for  Indonesia  to  establish  an  administrative  entity  to 
monitor  compliance  with  the  newly-negotiated  severance  pay  regulations.    Other 
countries with severance pay programs, such as Barbados and Slovenia, have established 
arrangements to oversee severance pay statutes.  Indonesia may want to follow this lead. 
Regardless  of  the  policy  pursued  by  the  Indonesian  government,  further  data 
collection and research  are needed to assess the impact of severance pay or  evaluate 
future proposed programs.  Currently, the data available on severance pay in national 
surveys are limited.  Both the IFLS and Sakernas have collected data for only one year 
(2007  and  2008,  respectively).    Continuing  collection  of  severance  pay  is  vital  for 
examining  the  labor  market  outcomes  associated  with  changes  in  severance  pay 
regulations, especially the employment and wage effects for workers in the formal sector 
and those in the informal economy.  Additional research is needed to understand the 
barriers to compliance: lack of knowledge, lack of enforcement mechanisms, costs of 
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Table 1 
 
Comparison of employee and job characteristics 
 
  Percent of 
population 























Age in years     
15–19  6.4%  11.7%  21.8%  10.0%  4.7% 
20–24  17.6%  30.6%  21.1%  25.5%  4.4% 
25–34  34.0%  37.5%  13.0%  39.4%  3.4% 
35–44  24.1%  12.4%  6.6%  15.7%  2.1% 
45–54  13.7%  4.8%  4.5%  6.7%  1.6% 
55 and older  4.2%  3.0%  9.3%  2.7%  2.1% 
Average  34.4 years  28.4 years  10.5%  29.7 years  2.8% 
Gender     
Female  33.3%  45.3%  15.3%  62.6%  5.3% 
Male  66.7%  54.7%  10.6%  37.4%  1.8% 
Education     
Less than primary  5.9%  4.7%  10.3%  5.0%  2.8% 
Primary  20.7%  17.4%  12.6%  20.3%  3.7% 
Junior secondary  42.7%  21.8%  6.6%  45.8%  3.5% 
Senior secondary  16.8%  42.5%  26.7%  22.5%  3.5% 
Tertiary  13.9%  13.6%  9.7%  6.5%  1.2% 
 Industry 
Agriculture  9.1%  5.7%  21.5%  4.8%  4.6% 
Mining  1.6%  0.2%  4.3%  0.1%  0.4% 
Manufacturing  25.7%  15.6%  6.0%  20.3%  2.0% 
Utilities  0.6%  0.0%  0.8%  0.0%  0.0% 
Construction  6.2%  2.8%  6.9%  2.1%  1.3% 
Trade  14.8%  16.9%  11.9%  15.1%  2.7%   20 
Transportation  6.4%  4.3%  8.6%  4.6%  2.3% 
Financial services  3.9%  3.5%  7.8%  1.9%  1.1% 
Public services  31.7%  51.0%  21.2%  51.0%  5.3% 
Region 
Sumatera  17.2%  8.3%  12.0%  5.3%  1.9% 
Java/Bali  69.7%  89.6%  12.4%  93.7%  3.2% 
Kalimantan  5.1%  0.8%  14.7%  0.6%  2.9% 
Sulawesi  4.9%  1.4%  10.1%  0.4%  0.7% 
Tenure 
0–3 years  46.6%  74.9%  19.5%  63.4%  4.1% 
4–9 years  25.9%  16.5%  7.8%  23.9%  2.8% 
10+ years  27.5%  8.6%  4.0%  12.7%  1.5% 
Wage (IDRs) 
Below 250,000  7.0%  7.5%  19.1%  5.7%  3.6% 
250,001–500,000  19.6%  22.1%  15.8%  17.6%  3.2% 
500,001–1 mil.  36.5%  45.7%  14.6%  51.9%  4.2% 
1–1.5 million  16.1%  14.3%  10.1%  16.4%  2.9% 
Above 1.5 mil.  20.8%  10.5%  5.8%  8.4%  1.2% 
Average  1,126,790  940,404    990,303   
 
Source: Sakernas (August 2008) survey.   21 
 Table 2 
 
Severance eligibility and receipt by employee and job characteristics 
 
  Employees eligible 
for severance pay as 








pay as a proportion 
of all separations 
Age 
15–18 years  16.1%  12.9%  2.1% 
19–24 years  16.2%  13.4%  2.2% 
25–34 years  17.3%  39.5%  6.8% 
35–49 years  26.1%  56.6%  14.8% 
50–64 years  20.8%  36.6%  7.6% 
65 years and older  29.7%  66.4%  19.7% 
All ages  18.4%  33.4%  6.1% 
Gender 
Female  14.9%  26.8%  4.0% 
Male  21.3%  37.2%  7.9% 
Education 
Less than primary  20.6%  25.1%  5.2% 
Primary  23.9%  30.7%  7.4% 
Junior secondary  19.1%  34.6%  6.6% 
Senior secondary  18.0%  36.5%  6.6% 
Tertiary  8.8%  28.2%  2.5% 
Industry 
Agriculture  19.2%  24.6%  4.7% 
Mining and quarrying  17.6%  0.0%  0.0% 
Manufacturing  24.4%  32.4%  7.9% 
Utilities  0.0%  N/A  N/A 
Construction  24.3%  58.3%  14.2% 
Trade  13.6%  43.8%  6.0% 
Transportation  21.2%  72.7%  15.4%   22 
Financial services  15.0%  15.5%  2.3% 
Public services  17.8%  27.5%  4.9% 
Tenure 
Less than 1 year  14.1%  9.6%  1.4% 
1–5 years  16.4%  25.9%  4.3% 
5–10 years  26.8%  61.7%  16.5% 
10+ years  34.2%  60.9%  20.8% 
Firm size 
1–4 employees  10.1%  18.8%  1.9% 
5–19 employees  14.0%  26.1%  3.7% 
20–99 employees  21.3%  37.6%  8.0% 
100+ employees  25.4%  37.5%  9.5% 
Firm status 
Government agency  14.0%  11.6%  1.6% 
State-owned enterprise  19.5%  31.5%  6.2% 
Domestic private firm  22.8%  42.6%  9.7% 
Foreign firm  21.9%  22.5%  4.9% 
Individually owned  14.2%  26.4%  3.8% 
Other  18.6%  28.0%  5.2% 
Wage (IDRs) 
Less than 250,000  9.8%  20.3%  4.0% 
250,001–500,000  15.3%  18.3%  2.8% 
500,001–1 million  20.2%  32.7%  6.6% 
1–1.5 million  21.8%  52.4%  11.4% 
More than 1.5 million  11.9%  50.3%  6.0% 
 
Source: Sakernas (2008) survey.   23 






Severance pay by employee and job characteristics 
 








Ratio of actual 




15–18 years  1.274  0.145  11.4% 
19–24 years  2.335  0.052  2.2% 
25–34 years  7.862  1.710  21.8% 
35–49 years  14.172  5.464  38.6% 
50–64 years  13.201  11.727  88.8% 
65 years and older  9.125  0.302  3.3% 
All ages  9.362  3.608  38.5% 
Gender 
Female  7.193  3.116  39.4% 
Male  10.184  3.886  38.2% 
Education 
Less than primary  5.136  0.773  14.3% 
Primary  8.148  1.894  23.3% 
Junior secondary  7.064  3.085  43.7% 
Senior secondary  11.249  5.654  50.3% 
Tertiary  10.577  2.204  20.8% 
Industry 
Agriculture  8.702  2.892  33.2% 
Mining and quarrying  35.383  14.094  39.8% 
Manufacturing  6.862  1.375  20.0% 
Utilities  8.861  0.000  0.0% 
Construction  7.522  0.706  9.4%   24 
Trade  10.149  4.707  46.4% 
Transportation  14.980  6.479  43.3% 
Financial services  17.473  1.134  6.5% 
Social services  11.589  4.067  35.2% 
Other  10.472  5.620  53.7% 
Tenure 
Less than 1 year  0.923  0.076  8.2% 
1–5 years  4.416  0.576  13.0% 
5–10 years  12.662  2.155  17.0% 
10+ years  22.154  13.667  61.7% 
Firm size 
1–4 employees  7.383  2.561  34.7% 
5–19 employees  6.942  1.400  20.2% 
20–99 employees  8.484  1.360  16.0% 
100+ employees  12.380  7.198  58.1% 
Firm status 
Government agency  4.477  0.706  15.8% 
State-owned enterprise  12.677  13.697  108.1% 
Domestic private firm  9.308  3.129  33.6% 
Foreign firm  9.865  5.550  56.3% 
Wage (IDRs) 
Less than 250,000  1.298  0.347  26.7% 
250,001–500,000  3.843  0.724  18.8% 
500,001–1 million  8.820  2.888  32.8% 
1–1.5 million  14.954  5.016  33.5% 
More than 1.5 million  40.784  22.630  55.5% 
 
Source: IFLS (2007) survey.   25 
Table 4 
 
Severance pay by employee and job characteristics 
 








Ratio of actual 




15–18 years  1.279  0.087  6.8% 
19–24 years  2.729  0.211  7.7% 
25–34 years  7.958  2.527  31.8% 
35–49 years  15.512  6.181  39.9% 
50–64 years  21.399  2.302  10.8% 
65 years and older  7.883  0.329  4.2% 
All ages  8.264  2.410  29.2% 
Gender   
Female  5.751  2.047  35.6% 
Male  9.719  2.622  27.0% 
Education   
Less than primary  8.676  2.574  29.7% 
Primary  5.964  1.555  26.1% 
Junior secondary  8.573  2.065  24.1% 
Senior secondary  8.477  2.931  34.6% 
Tertiary  13.156  5.688  43.2% 
Industry 
Agriculture  8.520  0.835  9.8% 
Mining and quarrying  2.200  0.000  0.0% 
Manufacturing  7.842  2.872  36.3% 
Utilities  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Construction  7.101  2.873  40.5% 
Trade  10.928  3.544  32.4% 
Transportation  11.874  4.719  39.7%   26 
Financial services  10.920  0.833  7.6% 
Public services  7.235  1.978  27.0% 
Tenure 
Less than 1 year  1.135  0.215  19.0% 
1–5 years  5.024  1.018  20.3% 
5–10 years  12.545  4.952  39.5% 
10+ years  22.942  7.009  30.6% 
Firm size 
1–4 employees  4.044  0.225  5.6% 
5–19 employees  6.117  0.684  11.2% 
20–99 employees  8.234  3.040  36.9% 
100+ employees  10.431  3.283  31.5% 
Firm status 
Government agency  3.194  0.209  6.5% 
State-owned enterprise  21.043  5.963  28.3% 
Domestic private firm  9.230  3.522  38.2% 
Foreign firm  8.678  1.783  20.5% 
Individually owned  6.486  1.141  17.6% 
Other  6.283  1.224  19.5% 
Contractual arrangement 
Permanent  11.213  3.948  35.2% 
Fixed-term  8.262  1.723  20.9% 
No contract  7.687  2.481  32.3% 
Wage (IDRs) 
Less than 250,000  10.959  4.566  41.7% 
250,001–500,000  8.552  1.129  13.2% 
500,001–1 million  14.656  4.964  33.9% 
1–1.5 million  13.779  4.115  29.9% 
More than 1.5 million  17.088  4.675  27.4% 
 
Source: Sakernas (2008) survey.   27 
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